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Introduction: social media as a campaign tool 
Much has been written about the fact that social media facilitates the conditions for a more interactive and 
participatory form of politics, and for political public spheres to emerge online (Papacrissi, 2010). However 
whether any space within social media acts as a public sphere is reliant upon the organisations and individuals 
that use those spaces. On the whole research finds that social media is predominantly used by organisations, 
commercial and political, for broadcasting informative and persuasive content to their audiences. The 
difference between social media and other broadcast forms is that users can respond. Responses can be in the 
form of comments, positive or negative, users can share a message within their networks or endorse it through 
liking or making it a favourite. Highly active communities have been discovered, sustained by fans around 
films, books, authors, bands or similar (Baym, 2010). However, studies within the realm of politics find less 
hopeful signs, with interactions being limited, characterised as hostile ‘flaming’ or ‘graffiti’, and deficient in 
being deliberative, informed and reflective (Jackson & Lilleker, 2009).  
Most political parties across democratic nations have created their own spaces within social media. Ostensibly 
studies show that social media is seen as an important campaign tool across parties in EU member states 
(Lilleker et al, 2014) and parties utilized these platforms chiefly to further their electoral goals (Ross et al, 
2015), but whether their social media profiles are used by visitors and what forms of behaviour are 
encouraged is largely beyond official control without devoting significant resources to moderation (Jackson & 
Lilleker, 2009). Hence visitors to and members of party profiles can choose whether to show support, through 
using the like or favourite buttons, to extend the reach of the party through sharing or retweeting to their own 
followers; these we classify as actions. Additionally, or alternatively, users can respond to a post by adding 
their own comment: basically users can endorse, critique or question, or indeed ignore or avoid, as they wish; 
these we classify as interactions. This article is the first to gather data that allows us to detect and explain 
patterns of participation within social media. Our dataset is the posts and responses from the Facebook and 
Twitter profiles for all the 291 political parties who used these platforms standing across the 28 EU member 
states for election to the European Parliament in 2014. The aggregated data, organised by party and by 
country, allows us to determine how political factors determine which parties gain the greatest support and 
interaction (new fans or followers acquired during the electoral period). The disaggregated data consists of 
17,863 threads created by 291 parties on Facebook with detailed information (date, hour, format, length of the 
text etc) and number of likes, shares and comments to them. This data allows us to determine how 
communication factors influence actions and interactions. Cumulatively this paper provides the first analysis 
of the determining factors of political participation within the social media profiles of political parties. 
Literature review 
Studies find that social media, such as Facebook, provides social capital, usually measured in the number of 
friends, however the notion of capital may also spill over into other activities such as interacting with 
individuals perceived to be influential (Ellison et al, 2007). Research has also suggested Facebook acts as a 
social lubricant, encouraging individuals to convert latent to weak ties and enabling them to broadcast 
requests for support or information (Ellison et al, 2011). Our research questions whether we find evidence that 
social media might also offer political capital, for organisations, and act as a lubricant for online forms of 
political interaction and activism. 
Joinson (2008) proposes a set of seven gratifications which are relevant for Facebook users, these are: social 
connection, shared identities, content, social investigation, social network surfing and status updating. 
Joinson’s represents the most detailed, others propose four gratifications: socializing, entertainment, self-
status seeking, and information (Park et al, 2009). These broad gratifications categorisations are as relevant to 
the context of politics as that of the profiles of the corporate or entertainment environment. Those political 
activists who confine their activism to being e-expressive (Gibson, 2015) seek to satisfy their needs through 
being ‘political’ via social media. 
Motivations are suggested to not be within Facebook but external to Facebook. Offline interests, friendships 
etc. are accelerated and facilitated through Facebook. Furthermore usage of Facebook is driven by a 
motivation to communicate to the profile creator or about a topic (Ross et al, 2009). Baym (2010) reinforces 
the notion of there being an underlying motivation to communicate, approaching the study from the 
perspective of analysing fandom, she argues that connections are often made online through shared interests 
as opposed to offline friendships merely being replicated online. These connections, she argues, can be seen 
through interactions on dedicated pages. In the context of music fans, interactions demonstrate connections 
between individuals across sites and spaces, and connections can become stronger through interaction as well 
as wane over time (Baym, 2007). Arguably actions and interactions within the profile of a political party will 
demonstrate, through liking and making a favourite, a degree of support; sharing and retweeting a desire to 
make a particular message seen more widely, possibly adding text to show relevance within a network; 
commenting represents a desire to be heard either showing support or opposition, offering an alternative or 
oppositional proposal or responding to another user. Cumulatively each action and interaction contributes to a 
campaign narrative that can be viewed by any other user if they wish. 
There is evidence that an individual's success in society depends on the shape and size of his/her social 
network and ability to network and form connections with other social groups (Adler & Kwon, 2002). This is 
argued to be similar for organisations. In particular, organisations with influence within a network, virtual or 
not, which can harness the innate human ability to manage knowledge, will be able to lower transactions costs 
and become more profitable (Zyl, 2009). The concept of organisational capital has been applied to the use of 
social networks by organisations. Shih (2009) argues in fairly simplistic terms that social networks, focusing 
on Facebook, permits organisations to fulfil three objectives easily. Firstly product development can be 
enhanced through crowdsourcing feedback and interacting with past and potential users. Secondly it allows 
greater reach to a wider audience than can be the case for awareness campaigns using traditional media due to 
the chances of accidental exposure (Tang & Lee, 2013). Thirdly, as a concomitant, organisations can sell more 
of their products, with enhanced consumer satisfaction, to a wider group of consumers. If directly translated to 
a political context, parties could use social media to crowdsource policy ideas, support and engage in long-
term interaction with members and supporters. However, data shows political parties tend to use social media 
for ‘controlled interactivity’ at best (Stromer-Galley, 2000) and mainly for broadcasting messages (Jackson & 
Lilleker, 2009). Our data reinforces this, finding that out of 11784 posts receiving at least one comment only 
1,137 received a response from the party. We might therefore hypothesise that parties should gain minimum 
attention from their followers as users are argued to seek out organisations which adhere to the 
communicative norms of the social media environment and will interact with users (Lilleker & Jackson, 2011; 
Heller Baird & Parasnis, 2011), however this would seem not to be the case, though how we can measure and 
compare levels of attention and make a normative judgement regarding what might be high or low is a moot 
point. 
While there is wide agreement that social media holds enormous potential for companies to get closer to 
customers and, by doing so, increase revenue, and reduce costs and efficiencies, the same is less clear for 
political parties. From a broad service provision perspective, a range of studies suggest social networks are 
reengineering the way citizens or consumers interact with a range of organisations. Hawn (2009) found social 
media were changing the nature of interactions between patients and doctors, for example. Studies focusing on 
the value of user-generated social media communication find a positive influence on both brand equity and 
brand attitude, whereas organisational-created social media communication affected only brand attitude. Both 
brand equity and brand attitude were shown to have a positive influence on purchase intention (Schivinskia & 
Dabrowskia, 2014). These studies suggest that interest, measured in numbers of fans and followers and their 
forms and levels of engagement, may be an indicator of equity and support in the ‘real’ world outside social 
media. 
Small-scale studies of advocacy groups’ websites suggest that the use of dialogic strategies could lead to 
greater dialogic communication. One study also examined whether dialogic strategies utilized by 
environmental advocacy groups via their social networking profiles lead to greater dialogic engagement 
between organizations and visitors and was the first to examine the relationship between the creation of an 
online space for dialogue and actual dialogic engagement by identifying and measuring six dialogic outcomes 
(Bortree & Seltzer, 2009). Bortree & Seltzer find that where levels of conversation are visibly greater between 
members of a group who like an organisation on Facebook there are greater numbers of members and visits 
suggesting that interactions within a group lead to increased interest and support. Furthermore where the 
organisation visibly interacts with its members there are greater numbers of visitors converted into being 
members. In fact organizational engagement exhibited the most significant relationships with outcomes 
leading the authors to conclude that “strategies to create opportunities for dialogic engagement may produce 
positive outcomes such as increasing the number of stakeholders who interact with the organization by 
growing the organization's social network. This is especially true when the organization takes the first step to 
stimulate dialogic engagement by posting comments in dialogic spaces on their profile where users within the 
social network can then capitalize on available dialogic loops” (Bortree & Seltzer, 2009: 318). The size and 
character of our dataset makes it impossible to reliably determine the extent that organisations initiate 
dialogue, by asking questions, however we are able to map whether frequency of posts is correlated with fan 
or follower numbers, growth in followers and their subsequent levels of engagement. 
This approach is validated as success in terms of user engagement, be that following or being an active 
follower, is not simply a factor of initiating dialogue by asking questions. The richness of the content 
(inclusions of images and videos) raises the impact of the post in terms of likes. On the other hand, using 
images and a strategic publication time, for example posting when platform users are most likely to be 
browsing, significantly influence the number of comments (Sabate et al, 2014). To provide insights to 
practitioners willing to utilize social networks for marketing purposes, one study analyzed the factors in terms 
of characteristics of the content communicated by the company, such as media type, content type, posting day 
and time, over the level of online customer engagement measured by number of likes, comments and shares, 
and interaction duration for the domain of a Facebook brand page. The results show that there is a different 
effect from the analyzed factors over individual engagement measures (Cvijikj & Michahelles, 2013). As 
would be expected entertaining content, what we in previous work have classified as engaging content (Koc-
Michalska et al, 2013), such as pictures and videos, gain increased levels of engagement with pictures being 
the most popular. This is the case also for informative content, but curiously interactivity may decrease 
engagement. Cvijikj & Michahelles also found that posting on workdays and out of peak hours of activity 
within a network increased levels of engagement suggesting that posts need to be seen to be engaged with and 
so strategically parties need to be aware when the environment is least cluttered but also when their followers 
are most likely to be online. While interesting, the focus on consumer brands means we can raise questions 
about the applicability for a political context. 
Hudson and Hudson (2013) similarly found that for Facebook, the probability of generating engagement was 
dependent upon, inter alia the type of event, the number of fans and the number of posts by the organisers, 
whereas the level of engagement was dependent upon, inter alia the topic, timing, and length of the post, but 
also on the number of visitors and length of the event. For Twitter, engagement was also dependent upon the 
use of links and hashtags, the medium through which a message was posted, and whether or not a post was a 
reply to, or retweet of, another tweet. Youtube engagement was dominantly predicted by number of views. 
Hence there is a sense that the rich, measured in numbers of engaged users, will get richer and receive further, 
higher levels of engagement. 
Yet, the majority of studies find that the types of interaction on Facebook pages and user involvement are key 
factors affecting a range of behaviours, in particular decision making over purchases and building loyalty. 
Specifically where users could interact directly with the company and see an impact resulting from their input 
they felt greater involvement and so claimed they would exhibit greater loyalty (Shin & Kang, 2014).  
While communication style, timing and content is deemed important these studies tend to focus on highly 
prominent commercial brands, for example the four market-leading home-shopping brands (Shin & Kang, 
2014) or the top 100 brands advertising on Facebook (Cvijikj & Michahelles, 2013). Market leaders in any 
sector have an advantage in gaining fans, and politics is no different. Hence, independent of communication 
strategy, we might find that the political parties with historically high levels of electoral support will equally 
have the highest numbers of fans, make the largest net gain during the campaign and also receive the greatest 
number of actions and interactions. Many studies have used the normalization thesis to highlight how in 
politics the parties with the greatest levels of support in previous contests have access to greater resources, so 
have a more sophisticated offline and online campaign (Schweitzer, 2011; Lilleker et al, 2011) and gain the 
greatest attention through the campaign (Strandberg, 2013). However, within the context of a second-order 
election we also may find that smaller parties with lower resources are able to leverage the electoral context 
and social media environment to mobilize supporters to a greater extent, in particular where the European 
parliamentary election presents an opportunity to vote against the established parties. 
 
 
 
We therefore hypothesise that: 
Macro-variables 
H1: Parties in countries with larger Facebook penetration rate (number of Facebook users per population) 
have a potential to have larger social media communities.  
H2 Parties with greater electoral success will have larger social media communities, so confirming the 
normalization theorem, and in general we find a pattern between online support and vote share. 
H3.1 The profiles of parties with the greater number of users at the beginning of campaign period will receive 
a further dividend in profile likes or follows ; and H3.2: Parties with historical electoral success will attract the 
larger community (gain of new followers) during the electoral campaign. 
H4: The profiles of parties with the most content (in sheer numbers) will attract the greatest numbers of fans 
or follows. 
Communication strategy variables 
H5: The posts with the more engaging content, in terms of photo, video and hyperlinks will earn the greatest 
number of actions and interactions. 
H6: Posts with engaging content accompanied by explanatory text will earn a further dividend in actions and 
interactions 
H7: Interactivity among profile owner and fans influence the actions and interactions of fans 
H8: Activity and interactivity on previous post (tn-1) should have a positive effect on activity and interactivity 
on the next post (tn) 
H9: The timing of the post will be important for gaining a greater number of actions and interactions 
 
 
 
Methodology 
Sample 
The study is based on two samples. First, we use the aggregated data which comprises the activity of the 
parties (posting strategy) and the general responses it achieves (new fans or followers acquired during the 
electoral period; likes, comments and shares). Second the disaggregated data based on the detailed 
information on each Facebook thread created by parties during the campaign. The first sample includes the 
Facebook and Twitter profiles for all the 291 political parties who used these platforms standing across the 28 
EU member states for election to the European Parliament. The second sample includes 17,913 threads 
created by 291 parties on Facebook with detailed information (date, hour, format, length of the text etc). The 
collection, both samples, was performed during the two weeks before the EP 2014 elections held in most 
countries on 25
th
 May 2014, with the exception of United Kingdom, Netherlands (22
nd
 May), Ireland and 
Czech Republic (23
rd
 May), Slovakia, Malta and Latvia (24
th
 May) where the period of two weeks was 
adapted accordingly. We exclude from our analysis the day of voting, as in many countries posting on that day 
was forbidden until the closing of the polling stations.  The sample is based on all parties standing in the 
elections with the exception of a few local parties which entered no more than one candidate and so were 
impossible to detect due to their invisibility in the main media before the elections. Among the 291 parties
1
, 
213 were present both on Facebook and on Twitter, 11 were present only on Twitter and 67 only on Facebook. 
The aggregated data covers both Facebook and Twitter, the disaggregated data is only for Facebook.  
During the period of research we gathered and archived all the data available on both social media for all 
parties in the sample. We have used a special, paid version of an application called SoTrender.com to 
construct our data set from active official profiles of the political parties on the Facebook and Twitter profiles.  
 
Dependent variables 
Our set of dependent variables is based on the data available from the social media profile. 
Fans or followers of the profile: number of users who liked or followed the profile of the political party on 
Facebook or on Twitter. Our definition of fans or followers is those who decided to like or follow the whole 
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 In the preliminary data set we have identified 363 active parties however we eliminated those without an official 
Facebook or Twitter profile available two weeks before the election. 
profile, so that the feeds from the profile would appear on their news feed, and are people interested in the 
party and likely to be supporters or sympathizers. The mean for the Facebook fans for all parties in our sample 
is M=24,495 (SD=44,086), for Twitter followers M=16,765 (SD=38,781) (for general statistics per country 
please see the Appendix.). This variable is not correlated with the electoral campaign however allows us to 
describe the general trends within the countries or across parties. This variable is further used as an 
independent variable to control for the size of the community at the beginning of the campaign (t1). 
Community gain: number of new followers of the profiles on Facebook or on Twitter gained by the political 
party during the campaign. The overall Facebook community around political parties developed on average by 
M=1,778 newcomers (SD=5238) and Twitter by M=298 (SD = 619). Those variables are analysed by using 
aggregated data. 
Audience engagement counted separately in the number of Likes, Comments and Shares made by visitors on 
Facebook during the campaign period. The most popular activity is liking, number of Likes M=281 (SD=921) 
(with the largest amount of 31523 likes per post); other, more engaging activities are definitely less popular: 
for Shares M=61 (SD=402) (with the most shared post by 39550) and for Comments M=30 (SD=139) (with 
the highest post gaining 8342 comments). Those variables are analysed using the disaggregated data.  
The counted dependent variables indicate the usage of the Poisson regression however due to the strong over-
dispersion Pearson statistics for Poisson regression reach beyond the excepted values (P>20) thus we use the 
negative binomial regression which allows reaching Pearson statistics around 1 (Hilbe 2011). 
 
Independent variables 
Threads by the political parties: number of threads posted on the official profile by political parties during the 
two weeks of electoral campaign. The threads are recorded as the general number created on FB or TW during 
the campaign (for aggregated data) or are divided into photos, videos, status (text), links (for Facebook 
profile). The mean number of all posts for all parties on Facebook is M=60 (for photo M=26 (SD=37); for 
video M=7 (SD =9); for links M=23 (SD=42); for status M=4 (SD=11)) for tweets M= 119 (SD=187). When 
analysing the disaggregated date we use link as a reference group, following the argument of Cvijikj & 
Michahelles (2013) characterizing them as medium with high vividness and high interactivity, so being in 
between other activities (photo having low vividness and low interactivity; status having no vividness and low 
interactivity; video having high vividness and high interactivity).  
Country characteristics: countries are included as fixed effects in the regression with Ireland being a 
reference (Ireland was chosen as the country with an Internet penetration rate
2
 (M=78.2%) closest to the 
average for our sample (M= 77.8%)). Due to output size this is not reported but is available on request.  
Party characteristics. 
For aggregated data: Party years of existence (continuous) number of years since party was established; 
Party size (dummy) categorization of the parties according to their score in last national elections and number 
of seats in national parliament
3
:  major parliamentary (scored above 20%
4
 in elections, N=51), minor 
parliamentary  (other parties present in parliament, N=142), major fringe parties (gained more than 1% of 
national votes but do not sit in national parliament
5
, N=21), minor fringe parties (all other parties, N=77). 
Party ideology (dummy) and EU positioning (dummy) variables are based on the data delivered by the EU 
profiler study
6
. Party ideology consists of four categories: Right leaning parties (N=88), Left leaning parties 
(N=126), Centre leaning parties (N=32) and Single issue/other parties (N=45). EU positioning identifies three 
groups: Pro-EU (N=176), Neutral (N=59) and EU-sceptics (N=56) (comparative categories). Party in 
government or in opposition (dummy, 1= in government N= 72, 0 = in opposition N=219).  
For the disaggregated data: party dummies are used as fixed effects (omitted from the output) 
Facebook characteristics (for disaggregated data only):  
Interactivity indicates if the owner of the profile (political party) is responding in the comments section under 
the original thread to comments left by the visitors. 1,137 threads received additional interactivity where 
conversation was initiated among the political party and community members. The most commented thread 
had 78 responses comments from the political party, the mean M=.13 additional comments (SD=1.17). The 
variable is included in the analysis as dummy. 
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3
 We used that mixed system in order to detect parties which scored on general low in elections however due to electoral 
system have representatives in the national parliament (for example in France Debout la République gained .56% of 
votes in 2012 legislative elections however due to coalition electoral system has two representatives in  Assemblée 
nationale http://www.france-politique.fr/elections-legislatives-2012.htm (accessed 05.01.2015) 
4
 With the exception of Liberal Democrats (UK) who gained 22% of votes however have the minor parliamentary group  
5
 With some exceptions, please see the footnote above 
6
 EU profiler study directed by Alexander Trechsel and his team at EUI University, Florence. (Garzia et al, 2015)  
Post length continuous variable indicating number of characters in the text under the thread, some of the post 
could have no text at all, the longest post had 17,442 characters; M=212 (SD=497) characters, indicated as a 
logarithm. Additionally the types of interaction (Likes, Photos, and Shares) were measured comparing post 
content and text length in order to control for threads which included both more interactive and vivid content 
with textual content. Facebook recognizes and hierarchizes the threads according to only one out of four 
groups Video, Photo, Like and Status (in practice it means that if video is accompanied by text message the 
text is not taken into account). However it is important to control for the different character of the threads, as 
the meaning of video only content differs from video with comment and may be important for the type of 
interaction. 
Historical community activity indicates the activity of the community towards the previous threads. It 
measures accordingly number of Likes, Shares or Comments for the previous thread made by political parties. 
This controls for communication going viral, which may attract additional community members). This is a 
continuous variable, with first thread excluded, indicated as logarithm.  
Campaign stage: number of days since the campaign start, continuous variable from 0 being the first day of 
campaign to 13 being the day before  voting). Here we control for the development or maturity of the 
campaign and the possible influence of campaigning on community responsiveness. In the analysis we do not 
use data from the day of voting as due to the campaign silence in twenty one countries where posting is 
forbidden on the day of voting, as consequence the posts from that day are done after the campaign.  
Campaign silence in some countries there is an electoral silence 48h or 24h before the end of voting, We 
control for that using dummy variables where 0 = no restriction 1 = restriction on campaigning. 
Time intervals: we count in seconds two time intervals (in logarithms) since last thread and till next thread. 
With this variables we can control for the threads that are published in a very short time slots (in some cases 
the difference between posting photos were a few seconds), in such cases it was possible that the community 
would be active only on the last thread and not on the first thread of a series. It can be hypothesised that the 
posting systematically, leaving gaps between posts to allow for reading and responding, may have a positive 
impact on community activity (in contrary to very intense but sporadic communication).  
Days of the week counted as dummy for weekdays. We assume that people may be more active outside 
working days. Hour of the day (included in regression but omitted from the output) counted as dummy 
variable for hourly intervals.  
 
Social media political communities in Europe 
The size of the Facebook and Twitter community of fans or followers is highly dependent on party size, 
suggesting adherence to the ‘politics as usual’ hypothesis which states parties with highest financial and 
human resources, and highest visibility offline, have the highest following online. In our sample all parties 
perform better then minor fringe parties (so those gathering less than 1% of vote in national elections). Major 
parliamentary parties gather the largest communities on both platforms. Minor parliamentary parties perform 
better on Twitter than Major fringe parties however they gather smaller communities on Facebook. Political 
ideology is not significant for creating a community on Twitter. Parties with clear ideological stances – left or 
right oriented (in comparison to centrist or single issue parties) have more followers on Facebook. 
Country characteristics importantly differentiate the communities on social media. Not surprisingly the largest 
EU countries also gather the largest Facebook communities Italy (797ths), UK (784ths) and Germany (735ths)  
or Twitter communities Italy (702ths), UK (538ths), Spain (520ths) and as the exception the Netherlands 
(520ths).  The smallest Facebook communities are gathered in Latvia (1650), Estonia (16ths) and Luxemburg 
(17ths); for Twitter those are Bulgaria (318), Slovakia (1080) and Romania (2077).  
Facebook statistics allows us to compare countries according to penetration rate of political communities in 
relation to the Facebook users per country (dividing number of parties’ followers by Facebook users in 
country). Malta is the definite leader, as political parties achieved 22% of potential followers available on 
Facebook. Hungary (12%) Cyprus and Czech Republic (10%) are next, below are Luxemburg (8%), Sweden 
and Austria (6%), Denmark, Slovakia, Belgium, Portugal, Greece and Poland (5-4%), with parties from other 
countries gaining less than 3% of their potential audience, with France (1.6%) and Latvia (.04%) gathering the 
smallest percentage of Facebook users within their communities.  Findings from Table 1 do not confirm 
Hypothesis 1, parties from countries with the highest Facebook penetration rate per population do not gather 
proportionally more followers than other countries, with the exception of Malta, where Facebook reaches half 
the population and parties reach 20 percent of those Facebook users. Parties in other countries with similar 
Facebook penetration rates (United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark) hardly reach beyond a few percent of their 
potential supporters (UK 2.6%, SE 6.6%, DK 4.8%).  
 
Table 1. Politically oriented Facebook community in Europe 
 
Political 
fans 
Facebook 
users  
%a) 
ratiob  
Political 
fans 
Facebook 
users 
(% a) 
ratiob 
Austria 200 177 2 915 240 (35%) .069 Italy 846 181 23 202 640 
(37%
) 
.036 
Belgium 196 451 4 922 260 (47%) .040 Latvia 1 731 414 520 
(19%
) 
.004 
Bulgaria 59 032 2 522 120 (36%) .023 Lithuania 32 711 1 118 500 
(32%
) 
.029 
Croatia 49 369 1 595 760 (35%) .031 Luxemburg 18 391 227 520 
(44%
) 
.081 
Cyprus 59 854 582 600 (49%) .103 Malta 47 739 217 040 
(52%
) 
.220 
Czech 399 734 3 834 620 (36%) .104 Netherlands 182 390 7 554 940 
(45%
) 
.024 
Denmark 145 925 3 037 700 (54%) .048 Poland 381 727 9 863 380 
(26%
) 
.039 
Estonia 17 030 501 680 (39%) .034 Portugal 182 411 4 663 060 
(43%
) 
.039 
Finland 55 672 2 287 960 (43%) .024 Romania 115 036 5 374 980 
(29%
) 
.021 
France 402 044 25 624 760 (38%) .016 Slovakia 85 273 2 032 200 
(37%
) 
.042 
Germany 801 353 25 332 440 (31%) .032 Slovenia 24 245 730 160 
(37%
) 
.033 
Greece 149 859 3 845 820 (35%) .039 Spain 446 752 17 590 500 
(37%
) 
.025 
Hungary 525 463 4 265 960 (43%) .123 Sweden 325 735 4 950 160 
(51%
) 
.066 
Ireland 64 561 2 183 760 (45%) .030 
United 
Kingdom 
860 723 32 950 400 
(52%
) 
.026 
Source: http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats9.htm Facebook data for Dec 2014 
a. % of Facebook users among the population, b. proportion of political fans on Facebook to general Facebook community  
 
Regression analysis using fixed country effects, which means that we control for any characteristics of the 
country, (Table 2) confirms Hypothesis 2, well established political parties do have a larger communities of 
fans suggesting the normalization theory continues to dominate explanations of performance. However, 
interestingly, we can detect two patterns. All parties have larger communities on Facebook than Minor fringe 
parties, however Major fringe parties perform better than Minor parliamentary parties, so there is evidence of 
exploiting the mobilisation potential by parties on the edge of being (but which are not) present in the 
parliament. Parties with a definitive ideology (either left or right) also seem to build larger communities than 
centre-oriented or single issue parties. We can say a little about outsider parties (major fringe) in the context 
of 2
nd
 order elections, they may gain a dividend from protest supporters and so be successful at mobilization, 
clearly they seem to gain more supporters than minor parliamentary parties. 
Table 2. European political social media communities (here or appendix) 
  Facebook community size Twitter community size 
  Coef. Coef. 
Party size (comp. Minor fringe)     
Major Parliamentary 1.291** 2.344** 
Minor Parliamentary .678* 1.475** 
Major Fringe 1.182** 1.245* 
Party years of existence -.001 -.003 
Party ideology      
Left leaning .377* .368 
Right leaning .507** .089 
Pro-EU .327 .296 
Governmental party -.163 -.283 
BE .530** .364 
BG .271 -3.838*** 
CY .353 -.584 
CZ 1.333*** -1.810*** 
DE 1.719*** .813*** 
DK .816*** -.825*** 
ET -1.281*** -2.753*** 
ES 1.538*** 1.230*** 
FI -.307** -.231 
FR .929*** .732** 
GR .729** -.085 
HR -.651** -2.860*** 
HU 2.342*** -1.420*** 
IT 2.699*** 2.106*** 
LI -.792** -3.520*** 
LU -1.234*** -1.661*** 
LT -2.640*** -1.180** 
MT .263 -1.432*** 
NT .898*** 1.910*** 
PL 1.332*** -.731** 
PT .889*** -1.723*** 
RO 1.049*** -1.996*** 
SE 1.549*** 1.369*** 
SI -.863** -.820** 
SK .287 -3.848*** 
UK 1.157*** 1.056*** 
AU 1.066*** -1.236*** 
CONSTANT 7.788*** 7.405*** 
 
 New Community Building dynamics: external factors (party characteristics)  
Strategies employed may play an important role in attracting new fans and followers to Facebook or Twitter 
party profiles. Table 3 presents the regression results where the independent variable is the number of people 
who  started to follow the parties’ social media profile during the campaign. The regression analysis confirms 
the hypothesis (H 3.1) that there is a cumulative effect of parties already rich in followers or fans (at t1) before 
the electoral campaign gain most followers during the campaign (t2), even if this effect is minimal. However 
the growth in the size of the community on Facebook, in contrary to Twitter, is not related to overall party 
size. For Facebook there is no effect from being in the national parliament (and the finding persists if 
interactions between party size and size of the initial community are introduced into the regression). Results 
for gaining Facebook fans do not confirm hypothesis 3.2, we do not find the confirmation of the supremacy of 
the historically larger national parties, however since the differences are not statistically significant we also 
cannot confirm a mobilization effect of the campaigns of smaller parties, at the best we would claim that there 
is an equalization of the chances for community building as differences between parties are close to zero and 
are not statistically significant. Interestingly, for Twitter, parties of all size gain more than the fringe minor 
parties, however when introducing the interaction between party size and initial community we find that it is 
parties of each category but with smaller initial Twitter communities that gain most new followers. Parties in 
opposition are definitely more likely to attract a new community, on both Facebook and Twitter, reflecting the 
fact that governing parties tend to do worse generally at EP elections (Hix & Marsh, 2007). Left leaning 
parties tend to have slight advantage on Twitter, but political ideology, similarly to years of existence or 
position towards EU plays no role in community building. 
The types of content strategies employed by political parties for both Facebook and Twitter shows the effect 
of the active owners, the more posts the more chances to attract new fans or followers of the profile, 
confirming Hypothesis 4. The question of how party activity on social media translates into user engagement 
in general follows in next part. However for our macro variables we find the normalization theorem is 
confirmed for Twitter only, Facebook allows smaller in general parties to mobilize to a similar extent to the 
most popular parties, especially during the electoral period, but increased levels of activity can also lead to 
gains in supporter numbers. 
 
Table 3. New community members  
  Facebook new fans Twitter new followers 
  Coef. Coef. 
SM entry 
  
thread .006** .001*** 
Party size (comp. Minor fringe) 
  
Major Parliamentary .631 3.969*** 
Minor Parliamentary .393 2.029*** 
Major Fringe -.942 3.052*** 
Party years of existence .006 -.002 
Party ideology  
  
Left leaning .361 .431* 
Right leaning .072 .486 
Pro-EU .286 -.236 
Governmental party -.627** -.430* 
FB/TW fans t1 .00004** .0004** 
Interaction    
Major Parliamentary * nb of fans/followers t1 -0.00002 -0.00045** 
Minor Parliamentary * nb of fans/followers t1 -0.00001 -0.00042** 
Major Fringe * nb of fans/followers t1 0.00001 -0.00045** 
CONSTANT 4.206*** 2.840*** 
(1/df) Deviance 1.293 1.216 
(1/df) Pearson   1.186 .982 
N 278 79 
Country fixed effects omitted from the output  
 
While it is impossible to infer causality between the activities of parties and engagement of the network with 
their profiles on Facebook and Twitter and the outcome of an election, it is interesting to assess the extent to 
which support within a social media environment mirrors that at the ballot box, as we suggest in Hypothesis 2. 
We find that those who gained a greatest share of the vote were also likely to have the greatest number of fans 
of their profile but that this pattern is not the same for earning fans during the campaign. In other words, in 
most countries, they had built their support network prior to the campaign and the parties who earned fans as a 
result of the campaign were no more likely to gain votes than those that did not. Similarly, the parties who 
gain the most votes are also slightly more likely to have posts liked and commented on. However, what is 
interesting is that the parties who gained new fans during the campaign were the parties that were most likely 
to have a highly engaged audience carrying out a range of activities and extending their reach online. While 
this dynamic appears particular to Facebook, it would seem that those parties that are able to gain new fans 
during a campaign gain fans who are at that time keen to be part of an active audience, the engaged audience 
who actually take an active role in showing support as well as entering into conversations and responding to 
posts. 
Table 4: New community members and communication dynamics 
 Vote Share New Fans 
Facebook fans (total) .265** .535** 
New Facebook fans (earned during campaign) .058 ____ 
Likes of posts (during campaign) .151* .629** 
Comments on posts (during campaign) .139* .541** 
Share of posts (during campaign) .075 .640** 
Number of engaged (fans who performed any action 
during the campaign) 
.118 .378** 
Numbers indicate Pearson r. Stat significance * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
However the findings differ a little between nations. Specifically we find in Belgium (.666**), the Czech 
Republic (.582**), France (.768**), Greece (.913**) and the UK (.642**) there are clear correlations 
(coefficients and their statistical significance shown in brackets after the country name) between gaining new 
fans and gaining vote share. For the case of Belgium’s New Flemish Alliance, France’s Front National and 
Parti Radical de Gauche, Greece’s Coalition of the Radical Left and UK’s UK Independence Party this 
mirrors the rising popularity of extremist parties but shows in Belgium, France and the UK that it has become 
socially acceptable to publicly support the radical or Eurosceptic right. However, it shows that mainstream 
parties can also benefit, in the UK the Labour Party also gained significant numbers of followers, whereas in 
the Czech Republic the main beneficiary in terms of followers and electoral support was the populist but 
centre-left ANO 2011 party. Therefore, we find in some countries that the social media dynamics mirror wider 
political trends but that overall there is a much more mixed picture and for some countries the parties who 
gained online were by no means beneficiaries of a boost in electoral support. 
 
 
 
Communication strategies 
Social media allows profile owners to post messages which reflect their strategic choices (Table 5). For 
Facebook, most parties post photos and links, following the best practice of social media attractiveness larger 
parties tend not to post the text-only threads, however fringe parties are more likely to post text without any 
additional engaging content (photo or video).  Similarly for Twitter, as could be expected, the size of the party 
plays an important role in number of tweets in electoral period, with minor parliamentary parties being the 
most active.  
Table 5. Average number of posts by party size 
  VIDEO LINK TEXT PHOTO TWEET 
general 
7.44 
(SD 9.8) 
23.4 
(SD 42) 
3.8 
(SD 11) 
26.1 
(SD 37) 
118.8 
(SD 187) 
MAJOR PARLIAMENT 8.6 21 2.1 32 134.9 
MINOR PARLIAMENT 8.5 23 3 28.1 137.1 
MAJOR FRINGE 7.7 21.4 5.5 26.6 107.5 
MINOR FRINGE 4.8 26.4 5.8 18.6 69.3 
Note: differences are not statistically significant  
 
Community activities dynamics: internal factors (Facebook strategy) 
Political actors were especially active on the two days before election day, there is a strong drop off in posting 
the day before the election and again a rise on the day of elections (Graph 1). The low number of posts on the 
day before the election is most probably due to the campaign silence regulation in most of the countries. 
Although the restrictions are not fully clear for social media campaigning (as they are for the traditional media 
campaigning
7
), in countries where restrictions are in place there is a significant reduction in posting activity.  
Graph 1: Posting the threads by political parties on FB by day of campaign 
 
                                                          
7
 http://www.elections2014.eu/en/in-the-member-states (accessed 30.05.2015) 
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 We find similar patterns for community activity, there is a growing tendency of liking and commenting closer 
to the campaign, with the highest activity two days before and a drop on campaign silence day. However we 
see a spike in engagement on election day. This may suggest that the Facebook liking and commenting is less 
connected with the campaign activity itself but rather with expressing oneself as a person (who voted or not, 
and is satisfied or not). Gearhart and Zhang (2013) in their research on spiral of silence on social media found 
Facebook users rather passive readers not commenting on social issues unless the issue has a great level of 
importance for them. Possibly a similar logic is found in political context, a minority engage in actions and 
interactions on an everyday campaign basis (probably those traditionally engaged in political campaigning, 
those being more interested in politics, maybe being active also offline or engaged in party activities), 
however for the majority only the day of elections, the victory or loss of the party to which they feel close, 
may feel important enough to activate their propensity to express their support. Therefore, political expression 
on social media may follow the same logic of traditional expression, and be most likely to occur on the day of 
voting and when results are announced.  
Graph 2. Response of community by posting the threads during day of campaign 
Likes     Comments     Shares 
 
 
Different patterns are found for the sharing of the posts, an explicit measurement for the virality of the content 
and campaign promotion. Sharing, with its ups and downs, is divided into two periods: low-active first and 
high-active second week (graph 2).  
Political actors are most active during the morning hours (8 to 12 a.m.), and as a result most attention is given 
to threads posted during the working hours, the most popular, in number of likes, comments and shares, are 
the threads posted during the daytime from 6h to 21h, with key periods of activism being at 9 and 11 a.m. for 
liking and 3 p.m. for commenting, and lunch time for sharing. This may suggest that the strategic posting of 
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the thread at specific times may influence the engagement of social media activists as it may align with the 
times they check Facebook.  
 
Graph 3. Posting the threads by political parties on FB by hour of posting the threads during the day  
 
Graph 4. Response of community by hour of posting the threads during the day 
Likes    Comments   Shares 
 
 
The in-depth analysis of the influence of the internal dynamics on attracting engagement is examined by 
regression analysis on the number of Likes, Comments and Shares on the threads started by political parties.  
 
Internal dynamic of Facebook strategies 
In order to further understand the levels of engagement, and the types, we focus on the nature of the threads in 
order to understand how the strategies employed by political actors encourage actions and interactions. So 
basically what threads lead to campaign virality, gaining reach through community activities such as Liking 
or/and Sharing the content of the posts, or interactivity  encouraging the community to participate in online 
conversations by Commenting (positively or negatively).  
0
50
0
10
00
15
00
h_
po
sts
0 5 10 15 20 25
h
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
0
0
h
_
lik
e
s
0 5 10 15 20 25
h
0
1
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
0
5
0
0
0
0
h
_
c
o
m
m
e
n
ts
0 5 10 15 20 25
h
0
5
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
5
0
0
0
0
h
_
s
h
a
re
s
0 5 10 15 20 25
h
Table 5 shows the regression analysis on the three main activities performed by community members. The 
main explicative variables are interactivity, thread’s character, historical community score, and time 
specificity
8
.   
First, and probably the most intuitive finding is that interacting, so responding directly to comments of 
community members, brings a high dividend. Interaction has a strong positive impact on increasing further 
commenting and participation in dialogic discussion, as well as accelerating liking and sharing. This confirms 
Hypothesis 7 indicating that more engagement from the profile owner may reinforce the engagement of the 
community. 
Second the character of the thread brings different results. In comparison to leaving a link (reference group), 
posting photos is definitely the better strategy to attract any kind of activity, video content has a positive effect 
only on sharing activity. In contrast, status (with a medium size text) has a negative results, which is 
especially strong for not encouraging sharing. Communities tend not to share, like or comment on simple, 
short cost-minimal text, probably graffiti style (Jackson and Lilleker, 2009) posts by political parties. On the 
contrary elaborated and longer in character status threads (Status*Length of thread) do gain additional 
community activity, especially sharing and commenting. However the effect of the thread character effect is 
slightly altered if we introduce the interaction of posting photo, video, status or link with the text (controlling 
for the number of characters). If the photo or video is accompanied by a long text message it has no 
statistically significant impact (or is negative for liking) on community activity. This may suggest that social 
media may play an important role in transmitting the carefully constructed and presented messages that 
political parties wish to share with their communities. Further semantical analyses are required
9
 to understand 
this phenomenon, from quick browsing of the data we learn that it is mostly smaller parties that use the longer 
text expressing often their political views and ideological stands thus probably bypassing traditional media in 
reaching their audiences. Thus we find mixed results for the hypothesis 5 and 6, while interactive threads 
(photo) may bring an additional dividend, when combined with text they may bring negative results. An 
                                                          
8
 Some of the technical control variables (e.g. hour of post, detailed time slots, exponential of time variables etc.) are 
omitted from the output, as they do not influence the explicative variables strongly and serve as a base for the ‘best 
practice’ indication. 
9
 Text analysis is not the purpose of this study and it requires substantial resources allowing for analysis in 28 languages. 
Thus the presented explications are not based on systematic analysis but rather browsing in languages available to 
researchers.  
elaborated status update, in contrast to short, graffiti style text updates, may yield a the high return in 
interactivity of the community. 
Table 5. Regressions results for activity and interactivity 
 
Likes 
 
Comments Shares 
 Interactivity .372 *** 1.041 *** .596 *** 
Thread characteristics (ref. hyperlinks) 
Photo .834 *** .306 *** .666 ** 
Status -.914 ** -1.158 ** -2.888 *** 
Video .133 
 
.061 
 
.647 *** 
Length of the thread (ln) .035 ** .072 *** .143 *** 
Photo*Length of thread (ln) -.075 *** -.010 
 
-.010 
 Status*Length of thread (ln) .125 ** .185 ** .387 *** 
Video*Length of thread (ln) .003 
 
.016 
 
-.008 
 Historical community 
Likes for last post (ln) .109 *** .006 
 
.022 
 Comments for last post (ln) -.001 
 
.100 *** .026 
 Shares for last post (ln) -.015 
 
-.016 
 
.039 ** 
Time specificity 
Day of campaign .026 *** .025 *** .029 *** 
Time since last post (ln) .592 *** .581 *** .719 *** 
Time till next post (ln) .449 *** .426 *** .283 ** 
Number of posts within a 1 hour window -.062 *** -.085 *** -.069 *** 
Weekend  .025 
 
-.067 
 
-.072 
 Campaign silence 48h -.104 
 
-.231 
 
-.322 *** 
Campaign silence 24h -.168 ** .124 
 
-.267 ** 
Constant .379 
 
-1.692 *** -4.378 *** 
Dispersion 1.137 
 
1.029 
 
1.101 
 Diespersion - Pearson 1.950 
 
1.794 
 
1.924 
 Number of observations 16218 
 
16218 
 
16218 
 Stat significance * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note: time slots, squares and cubes of time slots, party fixed effects are omitted from the output. 
 
We observe quite interesting tendencies which we suggest is a result of audiences clustering around similar 
activities. Historical community activity (number of likes, comments or shares left for the closest previous 
thread) is statistically significant only within the same activity indicating a kind of clustering of the visitors. 
Number of likes for the previous thread has a significant impact on attracting likes for next thread but not for 
commenting or sharing. Similar patterns are found for two other activities, the number of comments on 
previous post may attract more comments on the next one (but not on shares or likes) and more shares in tn-1 
attracts more shares t1. This may suggest that certain community members perform one activity most, for 
example a person might like but not necessarily comment or share. These speculations on varied actions stay 
in line with other research on behaviour on social media. Gearhart and Zhang (2013) found three distinct 
social media behaviour: commenting, reading but not commenting and ignoring (with the fourth behaviour 
being offline discussion).  
Time specificity plays an extremely important role in explaining community behaviour. The intensity of likes, 
comments and shares grows over the lifetime of the campaign, the closer election day the more likely that 
supporters like, and supporters or opponents share or participate in commenting. Similar effects of intensity of 
community activity are found in other studies on Facebook during the elections, Wells et al. (2015) also 
founds that posts close to the election attract not only supporters of the profile owners but also opponents.  
The day of publication plays no statistically significant role in gaining community engagement, regardless of 
weekend or workdays (we also checked for the difference between each day, which was not statistically 
significant). Threads posted during the 24h campaign silence are definitely less liked or shared.  
Time slots since last post and till next post and hour of posting play an important role in attracting activities, 
and due to the complexity of their impact they are discussed further in more detail.  
 
Time slots and the yield of likes, comments and shares from posts 
The estimated model (table 6) allows us to investigate the strategies that parties could undertake to maximise 
the likes, comments and shares gathered during the campaign. We now turn to the effects of time.   
Since it is impossible to control for the cost of a post (party-specific), we cannot calculate the best strategy for 
a party to follow. Basing on the regression analysis we take the time characteristic variables and assuming that 
all other variables (including the constant) have a value of zero, we can evaluate different strategies and see 
what one can obtain on average the most actions or interactions. Table 7 shows the results calculated for each 
thread separately (hyperlink, photo, status and video) taking into account ten different strategies. We interpret 
only the time effects for a basic scenario of posting a hyperlink.   
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Modelling returns on ten strategies for communication  
Strategy type 
post / 
day Time  A. average yield from a post B. average yield daily C. Total n over campaign, 14 days 
HYPERLINKS     likes comments shares  likes comments shares  likes comments shares  
1 post per 14 days 0.071 
 
4.11 5.00 4.85 0.29 0.36 0.35 4.11 5.00 4.85 
1 post every two days 0.5 at 6-7h 3.04 3.73 3.88 1.52 1.87 1.94 21.31 26.14 27.18 
1 post per day 1 at 6-7h 2.84 3.47 3.69 2.84 3.47 3.69 39.81 48.63 51.61 
2 post per day 2 
at 6-7h,  
18-19 2.71 3.29 3.55 5.43 6.58 7.10 76.01 92.15 99.41 
6 post per day 6 6h - 21h 2.62 3.11 3.41 15.79 18.79 20.56 221.04 263.01 287.89 
12 post per day 12 6h - 21h 2.63 3.09 3.39 31.63 37.18 40.75 442.86 520.48 570.55 
1 post per hour - 18 a day 18 6h-23h 2.53 2.91 3.24 45.71 52.90 58.72 639.98 740.55 822.14 
2 posts per hour 36 6h-23h30 2.44 2.75 3.10 88.27 99.91 112.16 1235.79 1398.68 1570.26 
1 post each 5 minutes 216 6h-24h 1.27 1.07 1.67 277.56 234.79 363.68 3885.86 3287.05 5091.54 
continuous time inf 24h -inf -inf -inf -inf -inf -inf -inf -inf -inf 
PHOTO                       
1 post per 14 days 0.071429 
 
4.94 5.31 5.51 0.35 0.38 0.39 4.94 5.31 5.51 
1 post every two days 0.5 at 6-7h 3.88 4.04 4.55 1.94 2.02 2.27 27.15 28.28 31.84 
1 post per day 1 at 6-7h 3.68 3.78 4.35 3.68 3.78 4.35 51.48 52.91 60.94 
2 post per day 2 
at 6-7h, 
18-19 3.55 3.60 4.22 7.10 7.19 8.43 99.35 100.71 118.06 
6 post per day 6 6h - 21h 3.46 3.42 4.08 20.79 20.62 24.56 291.07 288.72 343.85 
12 post per day 12 6h - 21h 3.47 3.39 4.05 41.64 40.85 48.75 582.92 571.88 682.45 
1 post per hour - 18 a day 18 6h-23h 3.36 3.22 3.91 60.72 58.40 70.71 850.07 817.66 990.00 
2 posts per hour 36 6h-23h30 3.27 3.06 3.76 118.28 110.92 136.14 1655.97 1552.91 1905.97 
1 post each 5 minutes 216 6h-24h 2.11 1.37 2.33 457.64 300.88 507.56 6406.96 4212.39 7105.83 
continuous time inf 24h -inf -inf -inf -inf -inf -inf -inf -inf -inf 
STATUS                       
1 post per 14 days 0.071429 
 
3.19 3.85 1.96 0.23 0.27 0.14 3.19 3.85 1.96 
1 post every two days 0.5 at 6-7h 2.13 2.58 0.99 1.07 1.29 0.50 14.92 18.04 6.96 
1 post per day 1 at 6-7h 1.93 2.32 0.80 1.93 2.32 0.80 27.01 32.42 11.18 
2 post per day 2 
at 6-7h, 
18-19 1.80 2.13 0.66 3.60 4.27 1.32 50.42 59.73 18.54 
6 post per day 6 6h - 21h 1.71 1.95 0.52 10.31 11.84 3.24 144.28 165.77 45.30 
12 post per day 12 6h - 21h 1.72 1.93 0.50 20.67 23.29 6.10 289.34 326.00 85.36 
1 post per hour - 18 a day 18 6h-23h 1.61 1.76 0.35 29.26 32.06 6.74 409.70 448.83 94.36 
2 posts per hour 36 6h-23h30 1.53 1.60 0.21 55.37 58.23 8.19 775.23 815.25 114.70 
1 post each 5 minutes 216 6h-24h 0.36 -0.09 -1.22 80.18 -15.25 
-
260.13 1122.52 -213.54 -3641.77 
continuous time inf 24h -inf -inf -inf -inf -inf -inf -inf -inf -inf 
VIDEO                       
1 post per 14 days 0.071429 
 
4.24 5.06 5.49 0.30 0.36 0.39 4.24 5.06 5.49 
1 post every two days 0.5 at 6-7h 3.18 3.80 4.53 1.59 1.90 2.26 22.24 26.57 31.71 
1 post per day 1 at 6-7h 2.98 3.53 4.33 2.98 3.53 4.33 41.67 49.49 60.67 
2 post per day 2 
at 6-7h, 
18-19 2.85 3.35 4.20 5.69 6.70 8.39 79.72 93.87 117.52 
6 post per day 6 6h - 21h 2.75 3.17 4.06 16.59 19.15 24.45 232.19 268.17 342.23 
12 post per day 12 6h - 21h 2.76 3.15 4.03 33.23 37.91 48.52 465.17 530.79 679.23 
1 post per hour - 18 a day 18 6h-23h 2.66 2.97 3.89 48.10 54.00 70.37 673.45 756.02 985.16 
2 posts per hour 36 6h-23h30 2.57 2.82 3.74 93.05 102.12 135.45 1302.72 1429.63 1896.29 
1 post each 5 minutes 216 6h-24h 1.40 1.13 2.31 306.25 248.05 503.41 4287.44 3472.72 7047.77 
continuous time inf 24h -inf -inf -inf -inf -inf -inf -inf -inf -inf 
 
First, the average number of likes, comments and shares is the highest with infrequent posting (table 7 column 
A). As the frequency of posting increases, the yields in terms of responses to each post diminish. At the limit, 
with continuous posting, our estimated model implies that the yield per post becomes arbitrarily low. This is 
because there is a negative effect on too many posts within a small time frame, captured in our regression by 
the negative coefficient (β = -.062***) on the number of posts within a 1 hour window around the posting 
time (see the regression table 6). What may matter, however, for a political party is the total number of 
responses obtained throughout the campaign. To obtain the total number of responses within such a time 
frame we need to multiply the average yield from a post with the number of posts. Then we see in Table 7, 
columns B and C that the highest number of responses would be obtained from strategies with most frequent 
posting (albeit, as noted before, not in continuous time). 
Let’s turn to what the “best” strategy would be according to our model out of the ten considered, assuming 
that parties wish to maximize the total number of likes, comments and shares over the course of the campaign. 
If the cost of producing a post would be negligible, then this implies that the best strategy for each party 
would be to produce a post quite frequently, for example every 5 minutes (table 7, column B and C). Then the 
total number of responses would be highest – daily and over the course of the campaign. We can also infer 
that parties with larger costs per update would publish threads less frequently given a fixed budget, and obtain 
a higher average of responses per post. Similar results are found for photo and video, and to some extent for 
status update which indicates that posting text more often than every five minutes may have negative impact 
on gains.  
What we said so far applied to all parties on average – we disregarded the yield a party can have from each 
post that can depend for example on the characteristics of its internet community.  The latter (with other 
effects) is captured in our model by the party fixed effect and can be included in more precise calculations for 
each of the parties in the study. As an example we computed the yield of different strategies for parties in 
Great Britain. We find out that parliamentary parties (e.g. Conservatives, Labour, UKIP, Liberal Democrats) 
and major fringe parties (British National Party) should post as often as possible – for example every 5 
minutes, budget permitting but not continuously.  The picture is different for minor fringe parties. The model 
indicates they should post also frequently to gain the likes but less frequently to obtain comments or shares, 
otherwise said it is harder for the smaller parties to balance the costs and gains per thread.   
We should note that our model indicates that each post, as the campaign progresses, obtains more likes, 
comments and shares (the estimate of the variable Day of campaign is positive and statistically significant in 
all cases). After 10 days of the campaign, a median post would obtain 10% more comments and shares. Hence 
the best strategy would change also with the progress of the campaign: if the cost of a post is linear and the 
parties have a fixed budget for the internet campaign, then we expect parties to provide more posts towards 
the end of the campaign. Indeed, this is what we observe in the days before the end of the campaign -- the 
number of posts increases (see graph 1). 
 
Conclusions 
The data that can be extracted from Facebook allows researchers to understand the dynamics, in terms of ebb 
and flow, of actions and interactions that profile owners and their followers undertake. Twitter does not offer 
the same granularity of data, nor the range of user actions; therefore the majority of the data focuses on 
Facebook alone. Due to the scale of the data, and the fact that it is in the native language of each of the 28 EU 
member states, we are able to determine the effects of a range of macro and micro variables, but without hand 
coding no assessment can be made of whether the subject of the post or its tone influences the form or nature 
of community engagement. 
What we can say therefore speaks more about the extent to which party strategies in determining some aspects 
of content design and the timing of communication over social media can influence the actions of the follower 
community. The macro independent variables show fairly predictable results, with the larger parties having 
most fans, and parties who post frequently also gaining fans. But the data also shows that Facebook can offer 
dividends for all parties independent of their size and popularity at previous contests. Of course some of the 
dynamics may be specific to the European Parliamentary election, where smaller parties tend to benefit from 
protest votes; we also know that a range of more ideological and Eurosceptic parties gained in terms of vote 
share so it may not be surprising that the parties of government and those who inhabit the political centre 
ground were also not as popular during the campaign on Facebook and Twitter. 
Communication strategies are a little more surprising, and our sample allows us to build a concrete picture of 
what works for parties. Timing is clearly important, but so is content. Campaign videos are clearly designed to 
go viral, and it is good news for the parties that they are most likely to gain shares. Photos also gain shares but 
are more likely to be rewarded with a like. Status updates are more interesting and it seems if they are longer 
then they are likely to stimulate conversations. The fact that parties rarely respond may suggest that actually 
this behaviour is not desirable to party communication strategists. Hence, while we find a lot of interactions 
being contributed, some of which may be hostile, this type of behaviour may be problematic for parties; they 
require resources for monitoring, in order to censor or decide if an answer is required. So overall we find that 
if parties simply wish to harness their online support to gain reach they should use minimal amounts of words, 
concentrate on photos and in particular video and consider the patterns of responses in order to gauge 
frequency. As social media becomes more important parties will be keen to ensure there is a total 
communication strategy, so while the current fairly sporadic approach appears to be working it is likely that 
no parties are fully optimising the benefits from social media campaigning. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Statistics for Facebook fans and Twitter followers per country 
Country 
Nb of 
parties 
with FB 
profile 
Average 
number 
of FB 
fans 
St.Dev 
MIN nb 
of fans on 
FB 
Max nb 
of FB 
fans 
Nb of 
parties 
with TW 
profile 
Average 
number of 
TW 
followers 
St.Dev 
MIN nb of 
followers 
of TW 
Max nb of 
followers 
TW 
AUSTRIA 7 28597 22147 783 52748 6 3559 3225 0 7862 
BELGIUM 16 12278 11186 31 35499 18 6106 8411 0 28130 
BULGARIA 5 11806 16432 2000 40243 2 159 225 0 318 
CYPRUS 9 6650 13388 160 41860 8 1957 3844 0 11371 
CZECH REP 12 33311 30216 234 90840 10 1428 2241 0 6295 
GERMANY 21 38160 40894 132 114805 17 22986 35471 41 125453 
DENMARK 7 20846 9892 8909 38789 5 4944 4619 0 9725 
ESTONIA 5 3386 2435 799 6681 3 941 54 882 987 
ESPANIA 16 27922 48919 301 195637 14 37203 49796 0 139448 
FINLAND 12 4639 3873 78 12894 6 4736 3797 0 10425 
FRANCE 17 23650 41944 124 152948 15 25505 35849 919 108055 
GREECE 9 16651 15465 593 35663 9 8635 6619 0 18095 
CROATIA 12 4114 4199 50 10893 5 761 890 125 2319 
HUNGARY 7 100976 98909 3802 277240 5 2382 2286 81 5344 
IRELAND 10 6456 9758 302 33004 8 9182 9168 619 24156 
ITALY 9 94020 123833 549 401074 10 70206 91345 512 296944 
LITHUANIA 8 4089 4929 100 15747 4 612 788 0 1749 
LUXEMBURG 7 2627 1762 261 5125 6 997 882 435 2707 
LATVIA 3 577 291 352 906 4 2398 2448 34 5195 
MALTA 3 15913 11463 3927 26770 2 2044 2048 595 3492 
NETHERLAND 9 20266 12194 6590 48197 9 57821 100744 9294 323664 
POLAND 10 38173 46163 6799 149300 8 5407 6749 190 21576 
PORTUGAL 10 18241 17851 711 48259 6 2282 3718 0 9411 
ROMANIA 6 19173 8799 9614 31878 2 1039 432 733 1344 
SWEDEN 9 36193 28842 5555 81999 8 26566 10103 13159 39105 
SLOVENIA 7 3464 2577 1006 8179 6 3532 2449 1000 7735 
SLOVAKIA 8 10659 6945 4003 23732 4 270 309 4 656 
UK 26 33105 56799 0 171831 24 22444 36109 19 136071 
 
Table A2: Average number of posts in country per number of parties (number of posts divided by 
number of parties)  
 
all POSTS VIDEO LINKS TEXT PHOTO Tweet 
Austria 45 6 9.1 3 26 60 
Belgium 52 7 22 2 21 114 
Bulgaria 45 8 23 0 13 3 
Cyprus 109 11 76 9 12 99 
Czech Republic 37 4 10.8 2 21 25 
Germany 49 5 16 2 26 44 
Denmark 28 4 12.6 0.3 11 18 
Estonia 30 5 13 2 10 3 
Spain 79 14 18 5 42 228 
Finland 49 2 25 2 20 26 
France 38 4 22 3 9 229 
Greece 47 9 18 4 16 133 
Croatia 31 3 13 4 12 16 
Hungary 98 18 30 3 48 57 
Ireland 27 5 10 2 10 71 
Italy 162 14 31 18 98 304 
Lithuania 38 4 24 1 10 14 
Luxemburg 30 6 8 0.3 16 13 
Latvia 14 1 5 0.4 7 20 
Malta 123 22 57 7 37 91 
Netherlands 27 4 9 1 13 99 
Poland 79 16 28 5 31 100 
Portugal 98 11 48 5 34 42 
Romania 123 12 37 1 73 27 
Sweden 55 6 19 2 28 106 
Slovenia 70 7 22 3 38 198 
Slovakia 27 4 14 1 8 9 
United Kingdom 63 5 25 8 25 97 
 
Table A3: Average number of new fan or follower joining profiles in time of campaign 
 
FB new fans TW new followers 
MAJOR PARL. 1489 746 
MINOR PARL. 1221 257 
MAJOR FRINGE 6185 727 
MIOR FRINGE 1748 88 
 FB new fans TW new followers 
CENTER 205 1306 
LEFT 308 1394 
SINGLE ISSUE 122 1315 
RIGHT 379 2779 
 
Table A4: Growth % of the number of Facebook fans during the campaign period 
 % of community growth 
Austria 2.7 
Belgium 4.7 
Bulgaria 12.9 
Cyprus 5.9 
Czech Republic 6 
Germany 8.9 
Denmark 2.1 
Estonia 3 
Spain 18.9 
Finland 4.5 
France 2.6 
Greece 4.7 
Croatia 3.4 
Hungary .8 
Ireland 8.5 
Italy 6.2 
Lithuania 7.8 
Luxemburg 8.9 
Latvia 4.9 
Malta 3.1 
Netherlands 5.4 
Poland 18 
Portugal 1.3 
Romania 47.4 
Sweden 10 
Slovenia 37.4 
Slovakia 1.6 
United Kingdom 9.7 
 
